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 The process of integrating of small unmanned aircraft into the National 
Airspace System has often been attributed as the “wild west” (Levin, 2018; 
Hofacker, 2019; Karpowics, 2019). This attribution stems from the perception of 
lax regulation and loose oversight of small unmanned aircraft operators, similar to 
the lawlessness and frontier justice of the American expansion into the west. 
 Following the passage of FAA Reform Act of 2018 (PL 115-254), however, 
the Federal Aviation Administration is quickly “taming the west” by imposing new 
flight restrictions on recreational and hobbyist drone operators. Most notable 
among these new restrictions are the changes to where recreational flyers are 
permitted to operate. Under previous rules, recreational operators were granted 
liberal access to fly near airports, provided they provided advanced notification to 
the airport operator or air traffic control tower (PL 115-95, Sec 336, Special Rule 
for Model Aircraft). This authority deviated significantly from 14 CFR §107, which 
required flyers to apply for a waiver to fly in controlled airspace (14 CFR §107.41). 
Low Altitude Authorization & Notification Capability (LAANC) 
 In April 2018, the Federal Aviation Administration began a nationwide 
rollout of an alternative, expedited means for Part 107 operators to receive approval 
to operate in controlled airspace. The Low Altitude Authorization and Notification 
Capability (LAANC) was designed as a collaborative data-sharing arrangement 
between the FAA and industry to support UAS integration into selected areas of 
low altitude, controlled airspace (FAA, 2019g). Using industry-designed and 
supported mobile and online applications, users can rapidly submit airspace 
requests for flight in controlled airspace. UAS user airspace authorization requests 
are provided to the FAA and approvals are transmitted to the user in near-real time, 
enabling rapid access to controlled airspace. The LAANC system “automates the 
application and approval process for airspace authorizations” by validating 
electronic airspace requests with airspace data derived from “UAS Facility Maps, 
Special Use Airspace data, Airports and Airspace Classes, as well as Temporary 
Flight Restrictions (TFRs) and Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs)” (FAA, 2019g, p. 1). 
On July 23, 2019, the FAA announced the expansion of LAANC approval authority 
to include model aircraft and hobbyist flyers (FAA, 2019e). 
 The agency reports that LAANC is available at 595 airports, which includes 
FAA air traffic control facilities and more than 100 contract towers manned by 
private companies (FAA, 2019a; FAA, 2019f). In the nearly two years since its 
inception, LAANC has received and processed more than 170,000 airspace 
authorizations (FAA, 2019d). 
 
Problem 
 According to the docket filed by the FAA, “LAANC is expected to 
dramatically reduce the incidence of noncompliant operations. The FAA estimates 
a minimum of 30% reduction in noncompliance operations would result in 450 
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fewer safety reports over the next six months [time period ending circa April 2018]” 
(“Request,” 2017, p. 47289). Rupprecht (2019) identifies a key flaw in the FAA’s 
implementation of LAANC: “LAANC does not tell us if it fixed the problem it is 
attempting to alleviate” (p. 1).  
 Rupprecht’s (2019) criticism is not without merit—little data has been 
published regarding the effectiveness of the LAANC system in reducing UAS 
encounters with aircraft. Figure 1 depicts UAS sightings or encounters reported by 
pilots, controllers, and other aviation stakeholders. From November 2014 through 
June 2019, the agency has amassed 8,615 sighting reports, an average of 153 
incidents per month. Table 1 highlights the growth trend of UAS sighting reports, 
based on the number of reported monthly sightings.  
 
 
Figure 1. UAS Sighting Reports (Nov 2014-Jun 2019) (derived from FAA, 2019h).    
 
Table 1 
UAS Sighting Report Trend Data 
Year Total Sightings Reports Average / month Change Y/Y (%) 
2014      43*   21.5* N/A 
2015 1,210 100.8 369.0% 
2016 1,762 146.8 45.6% 
2017 2,121 176.8 20.4% 
2018 2,308 192.3 8.8% 
2019 1,171** 195.2** 1.5% 
Notes: *Two months of data reported; **Six months of data reported. 
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While the data indicates the annualized growth of sighting reports has been 
largely curtailed, it is not possible to identify the cause of this trend shift.  
An additional criticism of the LAANC system is highlighted by Law360 
(2019), “even assuming hobbyists and commercial operators alike can obtain near-
real-time authorizations to operate in restricted airspace nationwide, this only 
provides a mechanism for law-abiding drone operators to utilize the airspace – it 
doesn’t stop the rogue operators [emphasis added]” (p. 1).  
 
Purpose 
 The purpose of this research was to codify LAANC effectiveness by 
comparing LAANC authorizations against UAS flight activity identified using 
UAS detection equipment. The research team correlated detected UAS flight 
activity with corresponding LAANC authorizations, based on UAS origination 
location and operating timeframe.  
 
Research Questions 
 The research team sought to answer the following questions: 
 
1. What proportion of detected UAS activity carried out in controlled airspace 
can be correlated to a LAANC authorization? 
2. What proportion of detected UAS activity exceeds the maximum prescribed 
altitudes of the UAS Facility Map? 
 
Method 
 The research team employed an exploratory approach for this project, 
leveraging primarily quantitative data. A DJI AeroScope UAS detection device was 
deployed to capture UAS flight activity in proximity to Daytona Beach 
International Airport (KDAB). This project was approved by IRB Protocol 118-
114. 
Sample Selection 
Researchers selected the convenient sample location due to the relatively 
high number of historical UAS flights in the region and the fixed position of 
AeroScope equipment. Researchers estimate the sample location is home to 
approximately 649 Part 107 UAS operators and 1,147 recreational UAS operators, 
based on data obtained from the FAA’s Drone Registration Database (see Figure 
2). The researchers emphasize that data collection from the selected sample location 
may not necessarily be representative.  
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Figure 2. UAS Registrations in proximity to Daytona Beach International Airport 
by zip code, current as of CY2019Q4 FAA, 2019c). Note FAA-reported Part 107 
registrations for 32114 totaled 960, however, this number was moderated to 260 
due to a state grant-funded program in Daytona Beach registering an estimated 700 
sUAS that are administratively managed from Daytona Beach, but not physically 
operated in the area. 
 
Data Collection Instrument 
 The AeroScope device passively detects, identifies, and tracks UAS 
platforms using communications signals. In the deployed configuration, the 
standalone AeroScope is capable of unsupervised, 24-hour, all-weather detection 
of small unmanned aircraft systems. The device gathers detailed information 
including UAS model, status, flight path, home (launch) point, altitude, and other 
related information in real-time.  
It is important to note that the device does not detect all unmanned aircraft 
systems—only those manufactured by DJI. Exact estimates of DJI market share 
within the U.S. consumer drone industry vary. Research group Drone Industry 
Insights (2019) estimates that DJI market share exceeds 76.8%. A previous report 
by Skylogic Research (2018) estimated DJI commanded an estimated 74% market 
share.  
Data Collection & Analysis Procedure 
 Researchers collected AeroScope detection data for a period of 30 days. 
Collected data included detection date / time, drone type, drone ID, flight ID, 
latitude / longitude, home (launch) location, and pilot location. Researchers 
considered all co-located UAS activity with matching drone ID performed within a 
30-minute time period to be a singular operation. The dataset was cleaned to 
reconstruct split datasets in which a singular UAS operation was divided among 
several flights due to short detection interruptions. The location of each UAS 
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operation was extracted from the dataset by evaluating the UAS home point, 
operator location, and initial UAS detection location. Summary statistics were 
calculated for all detected UAS operations to assess operator behaviors. Tabular 
datasets were further converted to Keyhole Markup Language (KML) format for 
analysis purposes using Earth Point. Earth Point imports geolocation data, icons, 
paths, and polygons; and, supports advanced features such as GPS tracks, time 
sliders, and grid coordinates (Clark, 2019). 
 Current UAS Facility Map (UASFM) KML data was downloaded, based on 
agency source material (FAA, 2019b). The complex 36-character GLOBALID of 
UASFM boxes were converted for simplicity to representative, sequential 
numerical values for the sample location, referred to throughout this report as the 
UASFM Coding Schematic (see Figure 3). Researchers manually coded UAS 
detection location data to the accompanying UASFM grid of origin. 
Following the completion of the sample detection period, LAANC approval 
data was requested from the FAA. The furnished LAANC Approval Data included 
request type, start date / time, location, altitude status, and reference ID. LAANC 
approval location data did not include grid information. Instead LAANC request 
locations were identified by a bearing and range from the airport reference point. 
Researchers manually coded LAANC approval locations to the UASFM Coding 
Schematic. 
UAS detection data and LAANC approval data were compared to evaluate 
UAS detections and LAANC approvals over a period of time. Since the LAANC 
approval system cannot correlate to a specific UAS platform, the researchers 
determined that UAS activity detected within the same UASFM grid and timeframe 
as an active LAANC approval would be considered an approved UAS operation. 
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Figure 3. [Left] UASFM Coding Schematic used for project. [Right] Excerpt of 
UASFM KML Data (FAA, 2019b). Note: the selected UASFM grid box on the 
right would correspond to grid 30 on the left coding schematic. 
 
Results & Discussion 
 Researchers collected UAS detection data for a total of 30-days, divided 
into two timeframes. While the research team sought to collect during a consecutive 
period, the AeroScope needed to be taken offline from August 30 at 9:00am (ET) 
to September 7 at 11:00am (ET) to secure the device from damage during Hurricane 
Dorian. Detection data was successfully collected for the first period from August 
14, 2019 at 9:00am (ET) to August 30, 2019 at 9:00 am (ET). Detection data for 
the second period was collected from September 8, 2019 at 9:00am to September 
22, 2019 at 9:00am (ET). 
 During the sample period, 272 UAS operations were detected. One of the 
UAS operations fell outside the UASFM grid, leaving 271 useful datasets (see 
Figure 4). During the sample period, 94 LAANC approvals were granted or active 
within the KDAB UASFM grid, including: 41 Part 107 approvals (43.6%), 24 
recreational approvals (25.5%), and 29 manually-processed approvals (30.9%).  
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Figure 4. sUAS Detections in proximity to Daytona Beach International Airport 
(KDAB), August 14-September 22, 2019, displayed with telemetry. 
 
Operation Duration 
 Automatic LAANC requests ranged in duration from as little as 15 minutes 
to as long as 24 hours. The mean duration for all requests was 3:10:11 (Part 107 
mean = 4:09:57, Recreational = 1:23:05). The median duration for all LAANC 
requests was 1:00:00, with the median durations for both Part 107 requests and 
Recreational category requests being 1:00:00. The SD for all requests was 9:33:30. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of LAANC approvals, based on duration. 
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Figure 5. Automatic LAANC Request Duration by Operation Type. Duration bins 
are presented independently and exclude previous bins (i.e. “30m” bin represents 
15m < t ≤ 30m).  
 
The mean duration of detected UAS activities was 12:14, with the median 
duration being 5:01 (SD = 27:39). Thirty-two detections (11.8%) included only 
momentary activity—a singular UAS detection that failed to provide duration 
information. The distribution of detected durations is heavily right-skewed, with 
74.3% of UAS operations lasting durations of less than 10 minutes (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Duration of Detected UAS Operations (plotted in minutes). 
  
It is particularly notable that approval durations vastly exceeded the length 
of time of UAS detections, by a factor of nearly 20-1 (based on median values). 
0
5
10
15
20
25
≤15 min ≤30 min ≤45 min ≤1 hr ≤2 hr ≤3 hr ≤4 hr >4 hr
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
LA
A
N
C
 R
eq
u
es
ts
 b
y 
C
at
eg
o
ry
LAANC Request Duration
Automatic LAANC Request Duration
107 Rec
33
100
69
19 19
7 6 3 3 3
10
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 <5 5<10 10<15 15<20 20<25 25<30 30<35 35<40 40<45 >45
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
U
A
S 
D
et
ec
ti
o
n
s
Detected UAS Duration, 5-min increment bins
Duration of Detected UAS Operations (m)
8
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 7 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol7/iss2/4
This indicates that LAANC approval durations do not accurately reflect the 
duration of LAANC grid utilization. This can be problematic, as long-duration 
LAANC approvals obscure when UASFM grid areas actually contain UAS activity.  
Operational Date/Time 
 The LAANC system received and approved a mean of 1.9 automated 
LAANC requests per day, with a mode of 2 requests (SD =2.1). UAS detections 
averaged 8.2 per day, with a median of 8 per day (SD =3.1). Automated LAANC 
approvals were somewhat inconsistent over the sampling period, and the overall 
daily approval rate remained relatively low. Results are presented in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. Automated LAANC Approvals and UAS Detections by (Local) Date.   
 
 The research team assessed both automated LAANC approvals and UAS 
detections by day of week, to evaluate for possible trend patterns (see Figure 8). 
Generally, automated LAANC approvals remained fairly stable, with diminished 
activity on Mondays and slightly higher activity on Fridays. UAS detections show 
a dip in activity on Mondays, but remain relatively consistent throughout the 
remainder of the week. The researchers do not have an explanation for the 
variability of automated LAANC approvals or detections between various days of 
the week. 
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Figure 8. Average Number of Automatic LAANC Approvals & UAS Detections 
by Day of Week (based on Local Date). 
  
An evaluation was also performed on the time of day for automated 
LAANC approvals and UAS detections (see Figure 9). Both LAANC approvals 
and UAS detections follow relatively consistent patterns, with activity increasing 
during morning daylight hours and diminishing after hours of darkness.  
  
 
Figure 9. Detected UAS Activity & Auto LAANC Approvals by Time of Day, (24-
hour clock, Local Time). 
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UASFM Grid Utilization 
 The research team evaluated the overall utilization of airspace within the 
LAANC system, assessing both automated LAANC approvals and UAS detections 
based on UASFM maximum altitude grids. Automated LAANC requests and UAS 
detections within each altitude grid appear to be consistent with each grid’s 
proportion within the UASFM architecture for the sample location. Utilization for 
400-foot grids was most prominent, outpacing utilization of other grid types by 
approximately four to one. Researchers had anticipated that lower altitude grids—
those closer to airports and critical aeronautical activities—would receive 
significantly higher utilization, however the data did not support this presumption. 
Results are presented in Figure 10. 
  
 
Figure 10. LAANC Utilization by UASFM Max Altitude. This chart compares 
LAANC requests in the six maximum altitude areas to the proportion of the 
UASFM grid made up by those areas.  
 
 To better illustrate LAANC grid utilization, the researchers plotted usage 
on a 3-D depiction of the UASFM grid system. UASFM grids are colorized based 
on maximum altitudes (see Figure 11). The data suggests that LAANC requests 
tend to be clustered in high-utilization areas. The data seems to indicate that a 
slightly higher proportion of LAANC requests are being sought for lower-altitude, 
near-airport grids. Conversely, UAS detection results showed that utilization within 
the UASFM system was much more variable. This may suggest that UAS operators 
flying very near airports are more cognizant of flight restrictions or potential safety 
implications. Alternatively, this data may suggest that many operators may still be 
flying under the rescinded Special Rule for Model Aircraft. Section 336 of PL 112-
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95 provided special provisions for model aircraft operations, which included wide 
latitude for operating locations, provided the operator provide notification to any 
airports within 5 miles (FAA Modernization & Reform Act of 2012). 
 
 
 
Figure 11. [Top] 3-D Depiction of Automated LAANC Requests during sampling 
period using 3-D representation of UASFM Coding Schematic. [Bottom] 3-D 
Depiction of Detected UAS Activity in LAANC grids during sampling period. 
Note: Grid colors represent maximum UASFM altitudes: Blue=400 ft; Green=300 
ft; Yellow=200 ft; Orange=100 ft; Light Red=50 ft; Dark Red=0 ft. Y-axis 
represents quantity of [Top] LAANC approvals or [Bottom] UAS detections within 
the respective grid. 
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Compliance with UASFM Maximum Altitudes 
 When comparing UAS detection data against corresponding UASFM grid 
locations, the research team revealed several concerning findings. Only 177 
(65.3%) of detected UAS platforms fell within prescribed altitude limits for their 
respective UASFM grid location. Figure 12 shows all UAS detections organized 
using the UASFM Coding Schematic, with maximum UASFM grid altitudes 
depicted. 
 Particularly high-altitude UAS flights demonstrated elevated risk to 
National Airspace System safety, since sUAS operations remain mostly segregated 
from manned aircraft operations. At least 41 (15.1%) UAS operations were detected 
above 500 feet AGL. Of these UAS operations, 32 (11.8%) were above 500 feet 
AGL; 6 (2.2%) were detected above 1,000 feet AGL; and 3 (1.1%) exceeded 1,500 
feet AGL (see Figure 13).  
 
 
Figure 12. UAS Operations within UASFM Grids by Max Detected Altitude & 
Max UASFM Altitudes (plotted using UASFM Coding Schematic, measured in ft 
AGL). The red line indicates the maximum prescribed altitude within that segment 
of the UASFM grid. 
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Figure 13. Depiction of detected sUAS origination locations within KDAB 
UASFM grid. Numerals indicate max detected altitude to nearest hundred feet 
AGL. White markers are less than 400 ft; cyan markers are 400-499 ft AGL; yellow 
markers are 500-999 ft AGL; red markers are 1,000+ ft AGL.  
 
 Researchers attempted to ascertain the altitude safety margin for detected 
UAS operating within UASFM grids. Figure 14 shows the altitude safety margin—
the altitude below the prescribed UASFM maximum—for all detected sUAS 
operations during the sampling period. This is essentially a measure of the level of 
risk a UAS flight presents to the National Airspace System, as UAS flights that 
significantly exceed their prescribed UASFM max altitude are no longer segregated 
from manned traffic and more likely to pose a collision risk. Of the 271 detected 
sUAS operations, 93 (34.3%) were detected above the UASFM grid maximum for 
their respective location. Twenty-six UAS (9.6%) were detected within than 50 feet 
above the UASFM maximum for the location; 13 (4.8%) were within 100 feet; and 
55 (20.3%) exceeded 100 feet above the maximum UASFM altitude prescribed for 
their location. 
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Figure 14. Altitude Safety Margin of UAS Detected within LAANC UASFM 
Grids. This chart compares detected UAS flight altitudes for flights carried out 
within UASFM grid (regardless of approval status) against UASFM maximum grid 
altitudes. UAS flights carried out below the prescribed maximum grid altitude are 
displayed in blue, with their margin below maximum plotted in (+) feet. UAS 
flights carried out above UASFM prescribed altitudes are shown with negative 
safety margin values. Flights detected less than 50 feet above prescribed UASFM 
maximum for their grid are plotted in green; less than 100 feet above maximum in 
orange; and greater than 100 feet above maximum in red.   
 
Compliance with LAANC Authorizations 
 When researchers attempted to correlate LAANC approvals with UAS 
detections, only 19 of the 271 detected UAS flights (7.0%) could be matched to 
LAANC authorizations within the same grid (see Figures 15-20). It is difficult to 
ascertain why so few flights could be correlated to LAANC authorizations. The 
researchers propose the following possible explanations: 
• LAANC authorizations were not sought for the UAS flights 
• While LAANC authorizations were sought, some UAS operations were 
not flown 
• Some LAANC authorizations included models of UAS that were not 
detectable by the AeroScope device.  
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• While LAANC authorizations were received for specific areas, it is 
possible some UAS operators did not originate flights from within the area 
in which authorization was received.  
 
 
Figure 15. Low Altitude Authorization & Notification Capability Utilization 
Daytona Beach International Airport, FL (KDAB), 14 Aug 19 0900L - 21 Aug 19 
0859 L. LAANC approvals and detected UAS operations are plotted within their 
respective grid, based on the UASFM Coding Schematic (X-axis) and Date/time 
(y-axis). UAS operations that correlate with an accompanying LAANC 
authorization are depicted as an orange UAS utilization plot aligned within a blue 
LAANC approval. 
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Figure 16. Low Altitude Authorization & Notification Capability Utilization, 
KDAB, 21 Aug 19 0900L - 28 Aug 19 0859 L. 
 
 
Figure 17. Low Altitude Authorization & Notification Capability Utilization, 
KDAB, 28 Aug 19 0900L - 4 Sep 19 0859 L. 
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Figure 18. Low Altitude Authorization & Notification Capability Utilization, 
KDAB, 4 Sep 19 0900L - 11 Sep 19 0859 L. 
 
 
Figure 19. Low Altitude Authorization & Notification Capability Utilization, 
KDAB, 11 Sep 19 0900L - 18 Sep 19 0859 L. 
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Figure 20. Low Altitude Authorization & Notification Capability Utilization, 
KDAB, 18 Sep 19 0900L - 22 Sep 19 0859 L. 
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correlated to a LAANC authorization? 
 
 Only 19 LAANC authorizations could be correlated to UAS activity among 
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flown during LAANC authorization; (2) UAS not detectable by AeroScope UAS 
detection device; or (3) mismatching LAANC authorization location and UAS 
launch location. 
More notable, however, was the quantity of UAS activity that was carried 
out outside LAANC approval locations and times. The collected data for the sample 
location suggests that only about 7.0% of detected UAS could be correlated to a 
LAANC authorization. For the sample location included in this study, this means 
252 UAS flight operations could not be correlated to a LAANC authorization. The 
quantity of UAS flight operations taking place outside the scope of established FAA 
approval and safety management processes may indicate that current regulatory 
mechanisms designed to control UAS operator access to controlled airspace may 
not be working. 
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It is notable however, that some operations may still be conducted in 
compliance with FAA regulations outside of the LAANC system under the 
following conditions: 
• UAS operator received a manual Wide-Area LAANC authorization, 
permitting operation in any LAANC grid area without receiving automated 
approval, provided flight occurs below the maximum altitude for that 
respective UASFM grid. 
• UAS operator is operating under authority of a 14 CFR §107.41 airspace 
waiver, as outlined by 14 CFR §107, Subpart D.  
 
What proportion of detected UAS activity exceeds the maximum prescribed 
altitudes of the UAS Facility Map? 
 
 Of the 271 UAS flights, 93 (34.3%) were detected above the maximum 
UAS Facility Map prescribed altitude for their respective location. Moreover, of 
the 93 UAS operations detected above UASFM maximum altitudes, 39—14.4% of 
all detected UAS operations—exceeded UASFM maximums by less than 100 feet. 
Since most manned aircraft flights would be subject to 14 CFR §91.119(b) [1,000 
ft, over congested areas] or (c) [500 ft, over other than congested areas] minimum 
safe altitude limitations, even these UAS flights marginally exceeding UASFM 
limits would be unlikely to pose a particularly serious hazard to the National 
Airspace System. Researchers detected 41 UAS operations exceeding 500 feet 
AGL (15.1%), which poses a greater risk to manned aircraft in the National 
Airspace System. Of these UAS operations, 32 (11.8%) were between 500-1,000 
feet AGL; 6 (2.2%) were detected from 1,000-1,500 feet AGL; and 3 (1.1%) 
exceeded 1,500 feet AGL.   
 
Recommendations 
 This research highlights notable gaps in effectiveness and compliance with 
existing FAA policies for integrating small unmanned aircraft systems into the low-
altitude region of the National Airspace System. The research team recommends 
the adoption of additional proactive measures to curtail non-compliant operations, 
including formal and informal UAS operator education [FAAST Courses, Waiver 
Videos, etc], liberal use of deterrent measures [such as no drone zone signage or 
social media outreach], and continual promotion of UAS operator compliance tools 
[B4UFLY, FAA DroneZone, etc]. The research team also believes more stringent 
UAS operator enforcement measures are also warranted.  
 In December 2019, the Federal Aviation Administration released a notice 
of proposed rulemaking to establish 14 CFR §89, Remote Identification of 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This rulemaking action would formalize requirements 
for mandatory tracking of most small unmanned aircraft systems operating in the 
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National Airspace System. The new rule is anticipated to increase safety and 
security within the National Airspace System, by improving stakeholder situational 
awareness of UAS operations. It remains to be seen if Remote Identification will 
equip the Federal Aviation Administration, law enforcement, and other 
stakeholders with the means to effectively curtail hazardous or malicious UAS 
operations. 
 
Future Research 
 The authors intend to replicate this study at additional airports within the 
U.S. to validate findings. Aggregated data will be used to inform decision-makers 
and advise UAS operational policy development.  
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